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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PLEA
BARGAINS - CONSTITUTION HELD TO AFFORD CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS A RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
PLEA PROPOSALS UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.
COOPER v. UNITED STATES, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Cooper v. United States,l an OpInIOn filed in 1979 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, constitutional
protection was afforded a criminal defendant whose reasonable
expectations were frustrated by the prosecution's withdrawal of a
plea-bargain proposal.2 The court held that under "appropriate
circumstances" constitutional safeguards of fifth amendment due
process and sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
may prohibit the prosecution from withdrawing its proposal even
though no contract has been formed between the parties and the
defendant has not relied upon the proposal to his detriment. 3 Prior to
Cooper, defendants were afforded a remedy for the withdrawal of
plea proposals only in situations in which they had relied to their
detriment upon the prosecutor's promise (usually by entering a
guilty plea) and the prosecutor had subsequently breached the
agreement. 4
II. THE FACTS
The sequence of events in the Cooper plea negotiations was
relatively simple. Cooper, who earlier had cooperated with the
government as an informant and witness, was slated to stand trial on
charges of obstruction of justice and bribery of a witness. s Two

1. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
2. Plea bargaining is the negotiation process by which the prosecution and a
criminal defendant arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise. Typically, in
exchange for the defendant's entry of a plea other than "not guilty," the
prosecution will attempt to mitigate the penalty incurred by the defendant for example, by moving for dismissal of other charges in the case, by not
prosecuting unrelated charges pending against the defendant, or by recommending to the court that less than the maximum sentence be imposed. FEI>. R.
CRIM. P. IHe); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PL~;AS
OF GUILTY § 3.l<b) (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PLEASj.
3. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979).
4. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Broken Plea
Bargains].
5. Cooper was charged with having offered to remove himself as a witness in a
drug violation case in exchange for $10,000. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d
12, 14 (4th Cir. 1979>.
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months before the scheduled trial, his defense counsel entered into
plea negotiations with an Assistant United States Attorney. On the
morning of May 11, 1977, these negotiations resulted in a plea
proposal in which the prosecutor offered to bring Cooper's cooperation to the judge's attention and to dismiss all but one of the
indictments in exchange for Cooper's plea of guilty to a count of
obstruction of justice, his continued incarceration and cooperation
with the government, and his testimony at other trials. 6 With this
proposal in hand, defense counsel went immediately to see Cooper
and, by noon of the same day, had his assent to the proposal and
called the office of the Assistant United States Attorney to notify
him of Cooper's acceptance. Defense counsel was unable to reach the
prosecuting attorney until about 3:00 that afternoon.7 In the interim,
the Assistant United States Attorney was advised by his superior to
withdraw the proposal. When defense counsel finally spoke with the
prosecutor he was informed of the withdrawal of the proposal before
he could convey Cooper's acceptance. Protest of this action to the
United States Attorney's office was unavailing, and the district court
denied the defendant's motion to enforce the proposal. Cooper was
subsequently convicted on all counts and sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment. 8 This appeal to the Fourth Circuit followed.
III. THE LEGITIMATION OF PLEA BARGAINING
Today, over ninety percent of criminal prosecutions are disposed
of through guilty pleas. 9 Of those cases, a substantial number are the
result of plea bargains. lO Administratively, due to crowded dockets
and limited prosecutorial resources, plea bargaining has become a
"bureaucratic necessity"ll upon which the criminal justice system
depends. 12 Despite the frequent use of plea bargaining, the technique
remained until recently a "sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and
deliberately concealed by participating defendants, defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and even judges."13 For only a short time has plea

6. Id. at 15.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, note at 60; Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its
History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82
YALE L.J. 286 (1972).
10. ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, note at 60.
11. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 774 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legitimation of Plea
Bargains].
12. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 281 (1974) (see note to amend. FED. R.
CRIM. P. ll(e».
13. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977).
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bargaining been recognized as "an acceptable and even desirable
part of the administration of criminal justice."'4
Judicial recognition of the legality of plea bargains first occurred
in Brady v. United States. 15 In that case, the defendant, prompted in
part by the prosecution's promise to recommend that the death
sentence not be imposed, entered a plea of guilty. After his
conviction, he challenged the constitutionality of the plea bargain on
fifth amendment grounds, asserting that fear of the death penalty
had caused him to incriminate himself. The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the plea bargain, stating "we cannot hold
that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State."16
The Court stressed, however, that a guilty plea is a "grave and
solemn act,"17 and therefore must be entered voluntarily IS and
intelligently.'9 A defendant's overestimation of the strength of the
state's case or the potential severity of his sentence, however, was
held not to vitiate the intelligence and voluntariness of his guilty
plea. 20 In Brady, plea bargaining received the approbation of the
judiciary, opening the door to scrutiny of the technique by the courts.
Cases subsequent to Brady have developed four criteria by which
the validity of plea bargains and subsequent guilty pleas is assessed.
In addition to the requirements of intelligence and voluntariness,
fairness must be present throughout the entire negotiation process, 21 ~

14. Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 771-72. The reasons offered for
judicial acceptance of this once clandestine procedure include: prompt disposition of cases; shortening of pretrial confinement; protection of the public from
criminals released on bail; shortening of the time between the charge and the
disposition; enhancement of rehabilitative prospects; lessening of defendant's
exposure to the criminal process and potentially severe penalties; and
conservation of scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources. Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261
(1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); State v. Brockman,
277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1976).
15. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Accord, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970>;
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970>. For a discussion of the historical
origins of plea bargaining, see Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979), See also Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining; Compromises
By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970),
17. [d. at 748.
18. [d. at 755.
19. [d. at 756.
20. [d. at 757.
21. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); State v. Kuchenreuther, 218
N.W.2d 621, 624 <Iowa 1974) (state's breach of a plea agreement described by
the court as "nothing less than an intolerable violation of our time-honored fair
play norm, and accepted professional standards"); State v. Brockman, 277 Md.'
687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 382-83 (1976) (the standard "applied to plea
negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of
the case").
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and a defendant must be represented by competent counseP2 In
applying these criteria during the post-Brady era, the courts have
had difficulty safeguarding defendants' constitutional rights while,
at the same time, protecting society's interest in safety and crime
prevention.
The failure to satisfy anyone of these four criteria may result in
the plea bargain being found invalid. For example, a plea given
inadvertently, or without a full understanding of the consequences,
is invalid,23 as would be a bargain arising from secret offers made by
the prosecution and accompanied by threats that the defendant not
discuss them with his attorney.24 Similarly, relief will be afforded a
defendant if a prosecutor lacking authority breaches a promise he
cannot fulfill.25 On the other hand, courts have held that a valid offer
may be structured so as to encourage the defendant to plead guilty.26
IV. THE COOPER RATIONALE
The Cooper court was faced with a situation in which the
prosecutor's actions did not constitute a breach under traditional
contract analysis. Even so, in providing the defendant a remedy, the
court relied on Santobello v. New York, 27 a Supreme Court decision
22. While this is not yet a unanimous conclusion, there is growing recognition
among courts of the importance of counsel during the plea negotiations. ALI
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE ~ 350.3 at 611 (975) (commentary). See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 <1941> (where the Court found that
if the prosecutor deceived the defendant into entering a guilty plea, this would
be a deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights); Anderson v. North
Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.n.N.C. 1963) (plea bargain negotiated without
counsel struck down); cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 <1977>.
The Court discussed the importance of counsel when the defendant is alone
with the police for extended lengths of time. Justice Stevens in concurrence
stated: "[Tlhe lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and
commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long
run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's etTective representation
by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this [sic)
lawyer." [d. at 415.
23. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 <1927>.
24. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 0962>.
25. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir.
1976>, cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 <1977>. For a discussion of Palermo, see
Note, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 842 0977>. See also United States v.
Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975>.
26. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 480. A graphic illustration is the case of
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 <1978>. In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court found that a prosecutor's threat to reindict the defendant under
a Habitual Criminal Act if he did not plead guilty to the one count he was being
charged with did not constitute retaliation when it was later carried out. The
Court found that in the "'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such
element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecution's otTer." [d. at 363. That the defendant truly possessed
"freedom" to reject the prosecution's otTer was rigorously questioned by the four
dissenting Justices. C{ Sweetwine v. State. 42 Md. App. 1. 12.398 A.2d 1262.
1269 (1979) (discussion of the detrimental reliance bv defendants on a
bargained plea, citing with approval Bordenhircher ('. Ha.,:es).
27. 404 U.8. 257 <1971>.
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involving facts in which the prosecutor's actions did constitute a
breach under contract theory. In Santobello, the defendant withdrew
a previous not guilty plea to two felony counts and pleaded guilty to
a lesser, not-included offense in exchange for the prosecuting
attorney's promise not to recommend a sentence at trial. In the
course of the proceedings, a new prosecutor was appointed to the case
and, at trial, this attorney recommended the maximum sentence
possible, unaware of his predecessor's promise. The defendant
challenged his sentence, claiming the prosecution had breached the
plea agreement. Despite the sentencing judge's assertion that he was
not influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation, the Court
reversed the conviction and remanded the case, stating "that when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."28 Thus, the detriment
suffered by the defendant in waiving his constitutional rights by
pleading guilty, not the prosecutor's action (because his recommendation did not influence the judge), was decisive. Also of importance
to the Court was that the agreement had been reached through fair
dealing. 29 The defendant's detrimental reliance and the fairness of
the agreement are criteria upon which subsequent courts have also
focused. 3D The Santo bello Court noted that safeguards reasonably
28. [d. at 262 (emphasis added). This holding, which greatly improved the
defendant's position in plea negotiations, has been universally and unquestioningly cited. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 975 (979); Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.
1979); United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
McClintic, 570 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1978); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven
State Prison, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.s. 911 (1977);
United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller,
565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); State v. Neitte,
363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978); Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527 (1974);
State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57 (1972); Joiner v. State, 578 S.W.2d
739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Brooks v. Narick, 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978).
29. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
30. United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 1978) (detriment in
"adjudicative element" of a guilty plea would entitle defendant to dismissal of
indictment upon prosecutorial breach); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426,
428 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974) (defendant's reliance to his
detriment upon plea agreement and subsequent breach by prosecution could be
grounds for dismissal of indictment); United States v. Pavia, 294 F. Supp. 742
m.D.C. 1969) (prejudice to the defendant required before indictment could be
dismissed); State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(defendant allowed to withdraw his plea after detrimentally relying on the
breaching prosecutor's promise); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979) (prosecutor's withdrawal from the plea bargain before the defendant's
entry of a plea was not reversible error because defendant had not shown any
detrimental reliance on the bargain). But see State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9,
11 <Iowa 1979) ("in the absence of a finding of abuse of prosecutorial discretion
and resultant prejudice to defendant, it is improper for the trial judge to
undertake to impose upon the prosecutor an agreement with terms he believes
to be unwise"). See generally Legitimation of Plea Bargains. supra note 11, at
784-85.
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necessary to protect defendant's rights would vary with the circumstances. 3l Furthermore, dicta contained in the decision can be
interpreted to suggest that there is a constitutional right to specific
performance of plea agreements. 32
The Cooper court found Santobello's constitutional mandate to
provide a right, defined in part by contract law, to fair treatment
throughout the entire plea process, from preliminary negotiations to
in-court recommendations. 33 The Fourth Circuit stated that even
though Santo bello had not developed the "precise source" or "specific
content" of the protected rights of the defendant, "it was plain in
context that the source was constitutional."34 This, the court
believed, was authority to go beyond contract analysis in a situation
in which this type of analysis would not have protected the defendant
adequately. The court found that conduct that would be unfair in the
market place would always be constitutionally unfair, but that the
converse did not necessarily follow, because contract law is not
concerned solely with fairness. 35 Stressing that plea bargaining
involves the "barter" of constitutional rights, rather than the
"barter" of goods or services, the Cooper court concluded that the
"fortuities of communication" should not govern negotiations for the
exchange of such invaluable rights. 36 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit
declined to stipulate at what point, short of some tangible reliance by
the defendant upon the plea proposal, the right to specific performance arises. 37
Although the Cooper court did not establish a general rule, it did
employ a well-reasoned, three-step analysis in making its determination. First, it identified the source of the defendant's rights. Second,
it examined the facts of the case to determine whether these rights
had been abridged or denied. Finally, it tested the rights against a
standard of constitutional reasonableness. The source of the defendant's rights was found to be "the right to fundamental fairness
embraced within substantive due process guarantees," and the sixth
amendment "right to effective assistance of counsel."38 The court

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 515-21.
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1979).
[d. at 15.
[d. at 17. The Maryland courts, although not yet adopting the Cooper view,
have found that "rigid application of contract law to plea bargains would be
incongruous." State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 382-83
(1976). Strict application would be incongruous because the trial court usually
is not bound by the plea agreement and a defendant could never be specifically
,forced to plead guilty. [d.
36. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979l.
37. [d. at 18.
38. [d.
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found the relevance of fundamental fairness to plea bargaining "too
plain to require discussion."39 Regarding the abridgement of the
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
the court found that when a defendant learns of a government
proposal through his attorney, subsequent withdrawal of that
proposal by the government will erode the defendant's confidence in
defense counsel's capability and professional integrity.40 Sixth
amendment considerations should contribute to "a heightened degree
of obligation to the government's fundamental duty to negotiate with
scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas."41 That defense counsel
had been replaced before the trial was a strong indication to the
court that the defendant had lost confidence in his first counselor.42
In the final step of its analysis, keeping in mind the statement in
Santo bello that a defendant is entitled only to that which is
"reasonably due under the circumstances," the Cooper court tested
the remedy of specific performance against this "reasonableness"
standard. In reaching its determination on this issue, the court noted
seven factors that it believed made specific performance appropriate:
the proposal was made without any reservations as to approval; its
c~nt was reasonable; the prosecutor had apparent authority to
make such a proposal; the offer was promptly communicated to the
defendant; the defendant assented promptly and unequivocally; his
counsel promptly communicated his answer to the prosecutor; and no
extenuating circumstances existed. 43 Weighed against these factors
were the practical burdens that a decree of specific performance
would place upon the government. The court found the defendant's
rights to be of greater weight for two reasons. First, the right to
specific performance could arise only when an authorized prosecutor,
rather than the defendant, voluntarily opened plea negotiations.
Second, the court believed that requiring the prosecutors' office to
"keep the left hand informed of the right's doing" was the mere
imposition of a duty, rather than a burden, and therefore should not
be weighed in the balance. 44 Finding constitutional protection of the
defendant's expectations reasonable under the circumstances,45 the
court remanded the case for specific enforcement of the government's
proposal.

39. [d.
40. [d. Defense counsel must be able to make firm assurances to the defendant. A
plea, based on a contingency, which the defendant thought to be a firm offer

41.

may be invalid if the defendant's belief is reasonable. See United States v.
Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971).
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979).
[d. at 19 n.9.
[d.
[d. at 20.

42.
43.
44.
45. [d.
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V. STRENGTHENING DEFENDANTS' POSITION
In redefining defendants' rights and remedies in plea negotiations, Cooper builds upon Santobello 46 by explicitly identifying the
constitutional source of these rights and by expanding defendants'
remedies. Cases decided after Brady7 but before Santobello had, for
the most part, defined defendants' rights as contractual and had
offered only one remedy - withdrawal of the guilty plea upon a
prosecutorial breach. 48 The Santo bello Court broadened defendants'
remedies for breach by suggesting upon remand to the state court
that either withdrawal of the plea or specific enforcement of the
proposal could be considered. At that time specific performance was a
remedy offered by only a small minority of courts. Although the
Court's opinion did not explicitly state the constitutional source of
the remedy of specific performance, the concurring opinions of four
Justices indicate the nature of these underlying constitutional
considerations. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence stated:
I. . . favor a constitutional rule for this as well as for other
pending or incoming cases. Where the "plea bargain" is not
kept by the prosecutor, the sentence must be vacated and the
state court will decide in light of the circumstances of each
case whether due process requires (a) that there be specific
performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the defendant be
given the option to go on trial on the original charges. 49
Three other Justices, Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart, partially
concurred with the majority, stating that "when a prosecutor breaks
the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver of constitutional
rights implicit in the plea."50 The unequivocal acceptance by the
majority of jurisdictions51 of the validity of the .constitutional

46. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
47- 397 U.S. 742 (1970>.
48.J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS 7.19[2) (1978>. See also Neely v.
Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 956 n.4 (1973); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d
496,501 (2d Cir. 1957); Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1,4-6,398 A.2d 1262,
1265 (1979).
49. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 !l971l.
50. [d. at 268.
51. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v.
Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685
(8th Cir. 1978); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison. 545 F.2d 286
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500
F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); State v. Neitte, 363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978);
Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249.322 A.2d 527 !l974); State v. Thomas. 61 N.J. 314,
294 A.2d 57 (1972); Joiner v. State. 578 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 19791;
Brooks v. Narick. 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978>.
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considerations underlying the Court's decision in Santobello indicates a movement in the direction of providing stronger constitutional safeguards for defendants' government-induced expectations. 52
Cooper is the most recent decision broadening defendants' rights
in the context of plea negotiations. Earlier stages in this trend were
marked by courts' growing acceptance of specific performance as an
appropriate remedy53 when the prosecution breaches a plea agreement, and by courts' increasing willingness to find that a defendant
has a right either to withdraw his plea or have it specifically
enforced. 54 The Cooper court, by declining to circumscribe defendants'
rights by employing traditional contract theory, and by grounding'
those rights firmly in the Constitution, takes an important further
step.
The court could do no less. A defendant's guilty plea after
striking a plea bargain is tantamount to consent to the entry of a
judgment of conviction without benefit of triaJ.55 It is a waiver of
almost every fundamental constitutional right afforded a defendant
in criminal proceedings. 56 Safeguards sufficient for dealings in the
marketplace are ineffective when dealing with such precious constitutional guarantees as the privilege against self-incrimination, trial
by jury, confrontation of one's accusers, presentation of defense
witnesses, and conviction by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 57

52. One author has suggested that criminal defendants possess an emerging
constitutional right to protection of reasonable expectations engendered by plea
negotiations with the government. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 528.
His basis for asserting the existence of this emerging right is threefold: the
analysis clarifies judicial interpretations of Santobello, satisfies our perceptions
of fundamental fairness, and comports with other expectation interests which
warrant constitutional protection (for example, double jeopardy or the contract
clause of the Federal Constitution). [d. at 526. The author further suggests that
this i!' the interpretation that state and lower courts have adopted. [d. at
513-14, 518.
53. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 519. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, Green
Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431
U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933
(1974); Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 533, 333 A.2d 898, 900
(1975); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 583, 564 P.2d 799, 802-03
(1977). See also Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 793-94.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130
(1979); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687,699,357 A.2d 376, 384 <1976>. But see
Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980>.
55. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970>.
56. Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973>.
57. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 110, 361 A.2d
113,117 (1976) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 466). See also
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1964).
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Finding that constitutional rights arise at an earlier stage in the
. plea bargaining process than would contractual rights, the Cooper
court held that specific enforcement of a prosecutor's proposal is
compelled by the right to fundamental fairness found in the
fourteenth amendment, and by the right to effective assistance of
counsel found in the sixth amendment. 58
In affording defendants protection throughout the entire plea
negotiation process, the Cooper decision recognizes that the plea
bargaining setting is a strange hybrid. It entails bargaining
techniques from the open market, yet the "goods" being bartered are
invaluable constitutional guarantees. Although both the defendant
and prosecutor have bargainable assets with which to negotiate, they
do not deal at arm's length. 59 The defendant is negotiating for
freedom; the prosecutor for administrative convenience and a
reduced work load. The stakes are much higher for the defendant
because he or she must choose between certain incarceration and
trial with the possibility of a more severe penalty. In contrast, the
prosecutor will simply be adding another case to an already heavy
caseload. Because the two parties are bartering with commodities of
disproportionate values, a state's promise to a criminal defendant in
exchange for the waiver of fundamental rights should be subjected to
a particularly high standard. 60 Waivers of constitutional rights
should not be made to depend upon such fortuitous circumstances as
who speaks first in a telephone conversation. A defendant cannot be
asked to waive these rights without being able to rely upon receiving
what has been offered in exchange. The burden of scrupulous
fairness upon the state is ot unreasonable. Due process has always
mandated such a requirement: "[T]his burden is the essence of due
process of law. It is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that
must insure that the trial is fair."61
Aside from the constitutional issues, policy considerations also
support the Cooper court's decision. Enforcement of prosecutorial
promises by the courts will have advantages for prosecutors as well
as for defendants. One of the reasons the courts have accepted plea
bargaining is to ease the severe overcrowding in the criminal justice

58. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979l.
59. C{ Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Plea bargaining flows
from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors"l. For a
discussion of this case, see Note, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 875 (1978>60. See Martinez v. Mancusi, 455 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.l, cert. denied". 409 U.S. 959, 962
(1972) (Justices Marshall and Douglas dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 524. In this situation, the state's
extraordinary power and the critical nature of the proposals concerning
criminal consequences to the defendant should place a higher standard upon
the state. Id.
61. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 809-10 (1972),
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system. 62 If the state cannot insure the benefit of plea bargains,
defendants will be reluctant to enter into negotiations. 63 Moreover,
until recently, plea bargaining was viewed as a less than acceptable
practice. Even now, the technique does not enjoy unanimous
acceptance,64 and the judicial approbation it has earned will be
jeopardized should its use occasion prosecutorial abuse. 65 Repudiation
of promises through negligence or bad faith, deliberate harassment,
and use of the plea proposal as a means of testing a defendant's
confidence in his or her case are several of the abuses that could
occur absent constitutional protection of a defendant's reasonable
expectations. 66 Such misconduct lends support to critics' arguments
condemning plea bargaining and will erode whatever respectability
the technique has gained. Furthermore, a prosecutor compromises
professional integrity and weakens the state's case by breaching a
plea agreement. 67 As stated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Carter, in addition to the defendant's interest, of critical importance
is the "honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair

62. See Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 772.
63. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 512.
64. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS Courts
46-49 (1973). In calling for the
abolition of all plea bargaining, the Commission found the major vices of the
technique to be "reduced rationality" in the criminal process, a higher risk of
convicting innocent defendants, and an increase in defendants' burden to
exercise their constitutional rights - that is, to stand trial. Id. at 610-11. The
Commission stated that the disposition of criminal cases should not be "a
contest where the government's success is necessarily measured by the number
of convictions it obtains, regardless of the methods used." Neely v. Pennsylvania, 449 Pa. 3, 295 A.2d 75 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 954, 958 (1973)
(Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall dissenting from denial of certiorari).
See also Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 774; Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970>.
65. "There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system
vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual
and institutional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, there are
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise." Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). See also Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 20 (4th
Cir. 1979) ("[AJ failure to find a constitutional right and violation in this case
would necessarily give judicial approval to a practice whose possibilities for
easy abuse, or at least the appearance of abuse, are abundantly clear.").
66. See United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978); In re
Palodichuk, 22 Wash. App. 107, 110, 589 P.2d 269, 271 (1978); Broken Plea
Bargains, supra note 4, at 526. Published guidelines for plea negotiations do
exist. See ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, at 3.1; ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 350.3 (1975); FED. R CRIM. P. l1(e). These guidelines
are only skeletal, however, and leave much to the discretion of the prosecutor.
67. State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1979>. Even though the Edwards
court rejected the Cooper holding, it did state that "we do not condone hasty
plea proposals or casual withdrawals." The court did not, however, suggest how
such casual withdrawals should be remedied when there has been no tangible
detrimental reliance.

**

*

*

306

[Vol. 9

Baltimore Law Review

administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice."68
The expansion of defendants' rights in plea negotiations effected
by Cooper makes it increasingly important that prosecutors revise
their plea bargaining tactics. The prosecutor's office must act as a
unit, rather than "an amalgam of separate entities. [It] is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government."69 When an
offer has been made, it is reasonable for the defendant to rely on the.
apparent authority of the prosecutor as a representative of the
government, if not in the classic contract sense, then at least
psychologically.70
A prosecutor's apparent authority should be enough to bind the
government to its proposal; disagreements between a prosecutor and
his superior after a proposal is offered should have no effect."
Admittedly, prosecutors' offices are notoriously overworked and
understaffed, but even that is not sufficient reason to compromise
defendants' constitutional rights. Defendants should be clearly
advised whenever a prosecutor's proposal is conditional pending
approval of a superior.72 An inadvertent breach occasioned by a lack
of communication among prosecutors has the same effect on the
defendant as an intentional breach. 73
Rules and procedures 74 established in each prosecutor's office
would help to eli~inate uncertainties that might result in the
68. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (if such a promise
existed, the promise of federal agents in Washington, D.C., that no other
prosecutions would be brought against the defendant elsewhere would be
enforced).
69. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,809-10 (1972) (quoting S&E Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972».
70. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 526. This type of reliance is as injurious
as tangible reliance because of the serious consequences and the greater
resources and expertise arrayed against the defendant.
71. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979>.
72, The proposal should include any reservations as to performance or approval,
including judicial approval. See FEn. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2)·(4>.
73. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v.
Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975); Correale v. United States, 479
F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973>.
Many courts addressing plea bargain breaches have found the actual effect
of the breach irrelevant. They assert that the defendant's reliance and the
breach itself are of greater importance. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at
262 (breach found even though the trial judge stated that he had been
unaffected by the prosecutor's actions); Harris v. Superintendent. Va. State
Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173. 1174 (4th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's failure to make
a recommendation to the court held a breach even though the recommendation
would not bind the court>; United States v. Brown. 500 F.2d 375. 378 (4th Cir.
1974) (for prosecutor just to go through the motions honoring a promise not
sufficient to fulfill the promise).
74. See ALI MODEl. Com: OF PH~:·AHHAIN(:MEr-;T PH()('EDI'H~: 350.3. note at 613;
Legitimation of Plea Bar{?aills. supra note 11. at 799. SeC' al.~() United States v.
Fischetti. 475 F. Supp. 1145. 1151 (O.N.J. 19791.
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eventual repudiation of a plea bargain, as occurred in Cooper. An
agreement, once reached, should be reduced to writing.75 In addition,
any contingency subjecting the proposal to a superior's final approval
should be made a part of the written agreement so as to avoid any
misunderstandings. 76 Oilly attorneys who are trusted to offer reasonable proposals should be allowed to negotiate. Certainly, an assistant
attorney and the attorney's superior should discuss limits on the
proposal before negotiations are begun.
A further step, and one which is already required by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,77 is the disclosure of the plea agreement
in court, on the record. 78 A written agreement would facilitate this
objective. In Cooper, there was a misunderstanding as to acceptance
and approvaJ.79 Quite possibly a firm written proposal would have
eliminated that misunderstanding.
Overall, the intention should be to make all negotiations open
and above board. Subterfuge and secrecy can only hinder negotiations and create confusion. If the "left hand" is to know what the
"right" is doing, closer supervision of plea proposals is needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cooper will promote further acceptance of plea bargaining. The
constitutional protection afforded defendants by this decision and the
growing openness of plea bargaining will help to remove the tarnish
that this practice has acquired over the years. It is appropriate that a
process that entails waiver of constitutional rights be scrutinized
using constitutional standards. More courts must come to the same
conclusion as did the court in Cooper if full protection is to be
afforded defendants in plea negotiations. 80

Judith A Wood

75.
76.
77.
78.

Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 799.
See note 71 supra.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 1HeH2).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (notes appended to 1974 amendments); Legitimation of
Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 799.
79. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979).
80. But see Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980).
In this recent case, the Third Circuit did not agree with the Fourth Circuit
decision in Cooper, although it is unclear whether the Scotland court expressly",
rejected Cooper. The Scotland court noted that the factual situation before it
was very similar to that in Cooper, but rejected the Cooper court's argument
even though noting that the government's actions had been far from exemplary.
The major point of the Scotland opinion was that trial itself is an adequate
remedy for a repudiated proposal, and that a Cooper-type rule was an
unwarranted intrusion into prosecutorial discretion.

